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Abstract 
 
An extension of the Bachelardian notion of epistemological profile allows us to establish 
the appearance of a strong ‘conformist thinking’ component following certain formulations of 
the Galilean concept of the relativity of motion, namely those associated to the idea that the 
Sun might revolve around Earth from certain points of view. We deduce the existence of a 
strong remanent paradigmatic pressure related to the Copernican paradigm. A study involving 
more than 2900 students, primary school teachers and future teachers shows a 97% 
prevalence of (pre-Galilean) Copernican conformism. The epistemological profiles of several 
high level academics, including professional physicists, a mathematician and a sociologist 
show that, under strong paradigmatic pressure, even professional scientists can shift from a 
scientific to a conformist way of thinking, possibly related in some cases to a ‘gate-keeper’ 
posture. Even when desired, the personal shift to a more advanced (relativist) understanding 
of such a high-pressure issue as heliocentrism can be a lengthy process. Some consequences 
of this disturbing cognitive process for science education are also discussed. 
Blanquet & Picholle — Paradigmatic Pressure — PRPER 2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although scientifically closed for four centuries, the question of heliocentrism still 
puzzles many a layman. It has now become a common journalistic device to trick people 
about their scientific literacy: Bringing someone to admit that he still believes that the Sun 
might revolve around the Earth is a classic joke even in mass media. An eloquent example is 
an excerpt from the French edition of the TV show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, in which, 
to the question ‘What gravitates around the Earth?’, a candidate answers ‘The Sun’, after a 
majority vote of the public in this direction. His unfortunate answer instantly became viral 
worldwide. To this date, it has triggered almost 600 contemptuous comments on the illiteracy 
of the candidate (on nearly 220,000 views for a single Youtube rendering [1]). More generally, 
polls regularly conclude that a significant minority of the population (typically 20 or 25% 
[2, 3]) remain pre-Copernican. 
Or do they really? Beyond the cheap mockery, or perhaps because of it, everything 
happens as if the Copernican quarrel had left deep enough traces in the collective scientific 
imagination to make such answers difficult to interpret. How strongly influenced by the social 
and cultural context are they? Would they remain the same for different, less triggering 
formulations of the same physical questions, or in slightly different contexts? 
While social influence is known to be ‘a pervasive force in human social interaction’, 
yielding individuals to ‘modify their opinions, attitudes, beliefs, or behavior towards 
resembling more those of others they interact with’ [4], even when purely perceptual 
judgments are involved [5], or even when there are no other member of a given social group 
nearby [6], and has been the focus of many studies in the field of psychology [6, 7], it is 
seldom considered in scientific matters. 
On the contrary, scientifically minded people would often claim to be able to abstract 
themselves from such parasitic mundanities in order to deal objectively with scientific matters, 
a claim which may seem generally confirmed by the scientific community’s recognized 
ability to reach rapid consensus once all the facts are known about a given question [8, 9]. 
Yet, the example of heliocentric thinking might endanger this comfortable conclusion 
since it suggests that, in some cases, even well informed individuals might occasionally 
participate to an otherwise obsolete paradigm. 
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The purpose of this article is to determine to what extend people may defend notoriously 
scientifically obsolete positions, whether or not they’re familiar with the current ones ; what 
might trigger such epistemological skidding; how deeply and in what proportions people 
might be affected; and whether a solid scientific background and/or daily practice are 
sufficient to prevent them from reverting to some kind of non-scientific thinking. It also 
considers some consequences of this disturbing cognitive process in science education. 
 
A. Paradigmatic pressure 
Besides controlled scientific thinking and established scientific knowledge, all kind of 
parameters — sociological, psychological, linguistic, political, ideological, organisational, 
and so on — seem susceptible to affect the way a person thinks about scientific issues. It is 
customary, when such supposedly parasitic parameters are even considered, to assume that 
their total influence is generally indifferent, either because they are intrinsically negligible or 
because their influence randomly cancel each other out [10]. 
Since we can not identify and describe them in detail, we propose to group their 
cumulative influence under the umbrella expression of paradigmatic pressure. Qualitatively, 
the pressure imposed by a given scientific paradigm will be considered weak if a reference 
(direct of indirect) to a key issue of this paradigm doesn’t affect the average response to a 
pertaining scientific question; or strong if it induces a significant change (assuming a fully 
solved question, with a duly established and consensual answer among the scientific 
community). 
Note that while the notion of paradigmatic pressure strongly overlaps with the social-
cognitive notions of conformity (i.e. the act of changing one’s behavior to match the responses 
of others, often in order to ‘enhance, protect or repair [his] self-esteem’), and compliance (i.e. 
acquiescence to a request) [7], it is not limited to social interactions, but may also derive from 
one’s own knowledge, scholarly or not. Moreover, by analogy with other kinds of group 
pressure [5], different personalities, either more ‘yielding’ or more ‘independent’, may a 
priori present very different individual responses to the same paradigmatic pressure. 
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B. Copernican vs. Galilean paradigm 
As noted, the Copernican paradigm appears at first glance as one of the most likely to 
enforce a particularly strong paradigmatic pressure, yielding to an ‘extreme consensus’ and 
strong group polarization [4], due both to its mediatic status as a scientific literacy litmus test, 
to its historical position at the dawn of modern science both as the archetype of a scientific 
revolution [11] and as the stake of a critical quarrel between science and religion, and 
generally due to its deep embedment in our present popular culture. 
We will thus focus our study on the reception of scientific propositions more or less 
explicitly related to Copernican heliocentrism (1543 [12]), as opposed to the more modern 
relativist approach, as first formulated by Galileo: ‘For all things that also participate to a 
motion, this motion doesn’t act, it is a if it was not.’ (1632 [13]) While the former approach 
discuss the situation of the ‘center of the world’ (still an Aristotelician notion), shifting it from 
the center of the Earth towards the center of the Sun, the latter acknowledges that both 
positions and in fact every reference frames, are equally legitimate, depending on the point of 
view of the observer. While current time physics would generalize this ‘Principle of 
Relativity’ [14] in a more abstract ‘general covariance principle’, it can still be popularized as: 
‘There is no physically privileged state of motion’ [15]. 
Anyway, while ‘the concept that the Earth revolves around the sun [...] was once an 
exciting and disturbing possibility that inspired new actions and transformed the way people 
thought about the Earth and humanity in some surprising ways’, it nowadays seems ‘so 
ordinary that we do not even think about it twice’ [16]. It has even been suggested that ‘the 
position of the Copernican system during the scientific revolution was that of an icon, a 
rallying-cry, a point of reference, or even a shibboleth. The various arguments for or against 
proved less important than its simple presence as an ideal, a challenge to traditional learning 
or a symbol of the new.’ [17] and that ‘The great Copernican cliché’ might even, nowadays, 
be more metaphysical than physical in nature, being ‘premised upon an uncritical equation of 
geocentrism with anthropocentrism’ [18]. 
It is interesting to note that while the notion of a fixed Sun might, from an 
epistemological point of view, seem to be in contradiction with the common daily experience 
of seeing the Sun move in Earth’s sky, and thus to the primacy given to observation by 
empiricists, more rationalist minds may, on the contrary, consider the supposedly ‘objective’ 
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(in a Newtonian perspective, also obsolete from an Einsteinian one) rest of the Sun to be 
better founded than the ‘subjective’ personal experience of its apparent motion [19]. 
If its purely scientific features nevertheless remain central in the more controlled context 
of science education, the diagnostic remain quite alarming. It has been shown that pre-
Galilean (mis)conceptions — namely, the existence of a privileged reference frame, whether 
heliocentric or geocentric — are even more widely shared, and not only that ‘many students 
hold alternative notions in various basic astronomy subjects’ [20], but also that many teachers 
and prospective teachers of physics ‘show a deep lack of understanding of both concepts of 
reference frame and event’ [21], and have limited understanding of the Earth-Moon-Sun scale 
and geometric configurations [22]. The Copernican model remains seen as ‘the final essence 
of astronomical concepts’ [23]. Saltiel [24] established that for most students, ‘proper motion 
and immobility are defined intrinsically, and not with respect to specified bodies and frames’ 
and that ‘motion and rest are thus fundamentally inequivalent, a typical pre-Galilean view.’ 
Further difficulties relative to the Newtonian distinction between ‘real’ and ‘apparent’ motion 
are also well documented [25–27]. Panse, Ramadas and Kumar also established that ‘the more 
prevalent alternative conceptions are also the ones which are held with greater conviction’ 
[25, 28]. 
Concerning the principle of relativity itself, it has also been shown that even physics 
students enrolled in a course on special relativity tend to trivialize it by reducing it to a strictly 
kinematic interpretation [29]. 
 
 
 
II. A CONTEXT-DEPENDENT RELATIVISM 
A. Methodology 
In order to establish a baseline, a questionnaire was submitted to a sample of 2115 French 
first year college students in science (either universitary L1 or from the more selective 
mathématiques supérieures). The questionnaire included (among 102 other questions about 
science, maths and other skills) three closely related formulations about relativity in motion 
(Table I), to be validated or not. It was organized over 4 years through a running call from the 
French Physical Society (Société Française de Physique, SFP) to volunteer teachers. 
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Respondents were informed at the beginning of the course or training that their answers 
would remain anonymous and not be rated, but used only for statistical purposes [30]. 
The first question dealt with the problem in abstracto; the second one involved a child on 
a merry-go-round, reminiscent of typical classroom physics problems and presumably 
eliciting only a weak paradigmatic pressure; finally, the third formulation directly involved 
the relative motion of the Earth and the Sun, and was thus likely to bring out the full 
Copernican paradigmatic pressure, if any, by focusing the attention on the salient Copernican 
norm and thus making it focal [6]. The latter (Form. 3) was presented as an open question, 
while the first two (Form. 1 & 2) were multiple choice questions (MCQ): Yes / No / I don’t 
know. 
Formulation 1, 
MCQ (abstract) 
The description of the motion of an object depends on the 
observer who describes it. 
Formulation 2, 
MCQ 
(presumably 
weak PP) 
A child is on a merry-go-round. Sitting on a bench, his mother 
sees him rotating at a constant speed. From the child’s point of 
view, it is not the merry-go-round but his mother who turns 
around him. 
Formulation 3, 
open question 
(presumably 
strong PP) 
A person observes the motions during the day of the Sun in the 
sky and of the shadow of a stick on the ground. He argues that the 
Sun turns around the Earth in 24 hours. What do you answer? 
TABLE I. Three closely related formulations about relativity in motion, eliciting various levels 
or paradigmatic pressure (PP) 
 
For each tested formulation, answers were distributed among two broad classes labeled 
either ‘Galilean’ or ‘Copernican’, depending on whether they validated or not the proposed 
formulation. Note that most answers were very brief, and that these labels do not imply a 
direct reference to either Nicolaus Copernicus or Galileo Galilei, to their work or to their 
philosophies. A third broad class, ‘Other’, was added when more ambiguous or irrelevant —
 including ‘I don’t know’ —, but definitely non-Galilean, answers were elicited. 
For comparison, either Formulation 3 or an alternative Formulation 4 (but neither 1 nor 2) 
was also submitted, also through a questionnaire, to various other populations, including 357 
French primary school teachers and 269 other students, from high-school (21) to post-
graduate school (134). Note that while Formulation 3 directly referred to personal 
observations, Formulation 4 rather emphasized the possibility of diverging opinions. 
(Table II). Finally, we submitted to an additional population of 166 post-graduate students in 
a primary school teaching track (‘M1 & M2 MEEF’) a comprehensive formulation directly 
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referring explicitly both to a personal experience and to the notion of point of view (Form. 5), 
for a grand total of 2907 participants. 
Form. 4a, 
open question 
(presumably 
strong PP) 
Two people are talking. One argues that the Earth revolves 
around the Sun, the other that the Sun revolves around the Earth. 
They turn to you for your opinion. What do you answer them? 
Form. 4b 
(idem) 
Two pupils are talking. One argues that... [same as 4a] 
Form. 5 
(idem) 
Two pupils argue: the first states that the Earth does revolve 
around the Sun and that it is not possible to say that the Sun 
revolves around the Earth. The second one insists that, from a 
Terran point of view, we have the right to say that the Sun revolves 
around the Earth; he adds that when we look at the shadow of a 
stick planted in the ground during we can see his shadow moving 
throughout the day. Which pupil do you agree most with? 
TABLE II. Same as Table I, Additional formulations 
 
 
B. Results 
1. SFP Questionnaire 
A first remarkable result is that none of the 2115 students involved in the SFP study 
chosed the ‘I don’t know’ answer proposed on the multiple choice questions. 
The first, more abstract formulation induced a strong majority (88%) of correct (Galilean) 
answers (Table III). This is an expected result, or even a somewhat disappointing one for 
science college students since, according to French programmes [31], the skill ‘Understand 
that the nature of the observed movement depends on the chosen frame of reference’ is in fact 
expected as soon as the first year of high school, and work on it is often continued during the 
two additional years from there to college. 
Population Form. Nb Copernican Galilean Don’t know 
1st year college 
science students 1 2115 11.9% 88.1% 0 
TABLE III. Proportion of students validating (‘Galilean’ answer) or not 
(‘Copernican’) the proposition that the description of a motion depends on the 
observer.  
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The concrete application of this principle of relativity nevertheless already appears a bit 
more difficult, even within a presumably weak-pressure context, since 14% less student (74%) 
manage to also validate Formulation 2 (Table IV). 
Population Form. Nb Copernican Galilean Don’t know 
1st year college 
science students 2 2115 26% 74% 0 
TABLE IV. Same as Table III, but with Formulation 2 
(merry-go-round, weak paradigmatic pressure) 
While they confirm the seemingly pessimistic estimations of the medias about scientific 
literacy [2, 3] (even if our questionnaire oriented incorrect ‘non-Galilean’ answers towards 
Copernican rather than towards pre-Copernican answers), these first results must be 
immediately relativized. 
Not only does the more abstract Formulation 1, closer to those offered by manuals, 
diminish the proportion of wrong answers by more than a factor 2 with regards to a more 
concrete formulation (Form. 2), but even those among the first year college science students 
who gave `informed’ Galilean answers regarding both formulations 1 & 2 (1424, or 67.3 % of 
the initial 2115) will massively shift to a ‘Copernican’ stance when confronted to a 
proposition involving the relative motion of the Earth and the Sun (Form. 3), with less than 
4% maintaining a Galilean stance in this modified context, as shown in Table V. 
 
Population Form. Nb Copernican Other Galilean 
Previously ‘Galilean’ 3 1424 76.4% 19.8% 3.8% 
Previously 
‘non Galilean’ 3 691 69.8% 28.9% 1.3% 
Total 3 2115 74.2% 22.8% 3.0% 
TABLE V. Repartition of 1st year college science students 
answers to Form. 3, depending on their answer to the MCQ 
 
Note that, while it appeared that all answers to Formulations 1 & 2 spontaneously 
distributed themselves among the two main classes of the MCQ, it was not the case with the 
open question (Form. 3), which yielded a significant proportion (22.8 %) of more ambiguous 
responses, hereafter labelled ‘Other’, among students having previously validated both Form. 
1 & Form. 2 (‘previously Galilean’) as well as among those who had not (‘previously non 
Galilean’). In some cases, this ambiguity might be semi-deliberate and derive from a 
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reluctance to give either a clearly ‘Copernican’ answer in obvious contradiction with the 
previous two, or a clearly ‘Galilean’ answer in obvious contradiction with the dominant 
Copernican paradigm. 
Anyway, these results unambiguously validate our hypothesis that the answer to a given 
scientific question strongly depends on its formulation. The interpretation of the answers to 
such questions thus calls for a very cautious analysis of the context in which they are asked.  
But the key result of this first study is that an overwhelming 97% of this large sample of 
college-level students appear unable to apply correctly the same idea they were more than 
88% to validate earlier in the same questionnaire, as soon as the Earth-Sun problem is called 
on by Formulation 3, which was deliberately constructed to see if the participants would find 
themselves able validate the brutal proposition that ‘the Sun turns around the Earth’, 
hopefully by introducing either the (implicit) notion of frame of reference, or the notions of 
observer or of point of view (explicit in Formulations 1 & 2, respectively); or if they would be 
so disturbed that they’d fall back into Copernican thinking. 
 
2. Other populations 
We obtained similar results for 792 additional participants from various students and 
teacher populations, including 21 first year high school students and 114 second and third 
year college students following an optional course in science education, 300 post-graduate 
students in either a primary school or a high school physics teaching tracks, and 357 in-
service primary school teachers (Table VI). 
Little more than 3% of the total population surveyed (students of various levels and 
teachers, Table VI) use the Galilean concept of relativity of the movement to answer the 
question. Although students learning to teach physics perform slightly better than other 
participants, nine out of ten of them remain Copernican. 
The physics teacher of the 21 high school students questioned was surprised, and 
disappointed, that only one of them mobilizes the principle of relativity, although she had 
them working on it the previous week, and on an astronomical example. It is interesting to 
note, however, that while the work done in class had not been met with particular reservations, 
she had chosen to apply it to the description of the relative motion of Venus and the Sun, a 
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problem mathematically equivalent to the relative motion of Earth and the Sun but which, 
unlike the questionnaire, does not constitute a direct reference to the Copernican problem. 
Population Form. Nb Copernican Other Galilean 
1st year high school 
students 4 21 90.4% 4.8% 4.8% 
2d & 3rd year college 
students 4 114 98.2% 0 1.8% 
Students in a primary 
school teaching track 4 103 83.5% 16.5% 0 
Students in a primary 
school teaching track 5 166 89.8% 0 10.2% 
Students in a HS 
physics teaching track 4 31 90.3% 0 9.7% 
Primary school 
teachers 3 357 91.6% 5.6% 2.8% 
Total Other 
populations  792 91.0% 4.8% 4.2% 
Total simple 
(including SFP)  2907 78.8% 17.9% 3.3% 
TABLE VI. Same as Table III, but with a question about 
the relative motion of the Earth and the Sun (Form. 3, 4, or 5) 
and for various student and teacher populations 
 
While the more explicit and yielding Formulation 5 appears to limit the proportion of 
ambiguous ‘other’ answers and to induce the highest proportion of ‘Galilean’ answers among 
future primary school teachers (Table VI), the latter nevertheless remain limited around 10 %. 
 
C. Discussion 
At any rate, this first part of the study confirms a massive dependence of the participants 
answers to a given physical problem on the precise formulation of the question. 
Even if one can not exclude, at this level, some contribution of a simple 
misunderstanding of the principle of relativity in motion, it also confirms that, as expected, 
scientific judgment can be strongly affected by the simple mention of a possible motion of the 
Sun around the Earth, regardless of the fact that this is a fully legitimate point of view within 
the Galilean relativist paradigm (at least as soon as a Terran point of view is specified), 
although in total contradiction with the older Copernican paradigm. The understanding and 
appropriation of the concept of relativity by the participants to the study thus appears highly 
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context-dependent. Considering the size and diversity of the sample, it seems that this result 
can safely enough be extended to the general (i.e. non-specialized) public. 
An immediate corollary, also expected considering the historical weight of the 
Copernican quarrel, is that the pressure imposed by the Copernican paradigm is very strong 
and significantly higher than the pressure associated to the relativist paradigm per se. 
However, it also induces a very strong (and mostly correct) perception of Copernican 
views as highly consensual, which makes it difficult to distinguish between the participants’ 
conformist thinking, their likelihood of expressing a prejudice being strongly reinforced by 
their perception that most others would approve their response [32], and their compliance to 
the answer they believe the (presumably teacher) author of the questionnaire might expect [7]. 
It is interesting to note that while Formulation 3 underlines direct personal observations 
(of the motion of the Sun in the sky and of the shadow of a stick on the ground), and might 
thus have its legitimacy reinforced by the principle of primacy of observation, it doesn’t 
induce more Galilean answers than Formulation 4, which doesn’t. Paradigmatic pressure thus 
appears able to distort judgment regardless of personal experience, like group pressure in the 
classic Asch’s conformity experiments [5]. 
 
 
III. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROFILES 
 
A. Diversity of pathways to knowledge 
The scientific method is historically, at least in Western cultures, the third major access 
path to knowledge, after the immediate and the scolastic paths. We call here ‘immediate’ any 
direct access, non mediated, to knowledge, whether it is an a priori form of the latter, 
according to transcendental æsthetics [33]; a mystical evidence, in the religious acception of 
the term; a perceptive a posteriori judgement (‘The sky is blue’), or even a learned skill or a 
social norm (i.e. ‘certain standards, expectations, and rules for what is “normal” or 
“appropriate” to feel, think and do’ in a given social group [6]) embedded enough to have 
almost become a reflex. The scholastic path explicitly lies on some external authority 
(typically, in the Middle Ages, Aristotle’s teachings), or more generally of some external 
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discourse. The scientific path, on the other hand, lies on the refusal of any argument of 
authority and on the rational examination of any relevant argument. 
It is important to note that these three pathways are in practice likely to be associated, in 
varying proportions, for a given individual and about a given question. Besides, even an 
hypothetical ideal scientist may justify his private religious faith by an epiphany, immediate 
in nature, and his personal political convictions by a scholastic adherence to a body of 
doctrine. Even better, as far as its very scientific activity itself is concerned, his 
epistemological profile may vary depending on the considered concept, from empiricism to 
discursive rationalism [34, 35]. 
We also know that these proportions, and more specifically the relation to the authority of 
already established knowledge, can strongly depend on the context: the same ideal scientist 
will not generally have the same spontaneous epistemological relationship to a knowledge 
new to him, depending on whether it is a canonical cultural object, duly validated by the 
corresponding scholarly culture (‘World 3’, in Karl Popper’s lexicon [36]); an unprecedented 
or unconfirmed research result, to which he will oppose a resolute methodological skepticism; 
a heuristic speculation (‘Anything goes!’ [37]); or an actual revolutionary claim (in the sense 
of Kuhn [38]), breaking with the dominant paradigm. 
Other more cunjunctural parameters can also affect the response of a scientist to a given 
proposition. For instance, in the United States, the question of ‘intelligent design’ has 
exacerbated an internal tension between science and religion, to profoundly modify the 
scientific discourse, and teaching postures, on these sensitive questions [39]. On a different 
note, some more quirky questions, such as those of perpetual motion or astrology, may induce 
more sociological than properly scientific ‘gatekeepers’ postures among professional 
scientists [40, 41]). 
 
B. A Bachelardian approach 
1. Identification of the epistemological components 
It is indeed to account for this variability of the epistemological posture of a same 
individual with regard to different concepts that Gaston Bachelard develops the notion of 
epistemological profile in his Philosophy of the No [34]. He observes that we retain traces of 
the steps we have taken to arrive at the understanding of a concept. He thus identifies the 
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crossing of successive obstacles to arrive at our current understanding of the idea of mass and 
associates these difficulties with the progressive overcoming of successive philosophical 
levels — naïve realism, clear empiricism and positivism, classical rationalism, complete 
rationalism — to achieve what he calls ‘discursive rationalism’ (or ‘surrationalism’). He then 
proposes to give an account, for a given individual and a given scientific concept, of these 
different philosophical levels in his appropriation of the notion by an ‘epistemological profile’. 
Established in a partially subjective way, it includes ‘on the x-axis the successive philosophies 
and on the ordinate a value which — if it could be exact — would measure the frequency of 
use of the notion, the relative importance of our convictions’ [34]. 
• For Bachelard, a symptom of a naive realistic relationship to knowledge 
is ‘the speed with which [a concept] is understood’ and mobilized under 
‘imprecise conceptual forms’ [34]. Thus, a subject will be satisfied to 
describe a movement ‘in absolute’, without precision of the reference 
frame of study or by using a ‘natural model’ [24]. In the same way he 
will be able to content himself with explaining the ‘broken’ appearance 
of a stick immersed in water by the existence of two media of different 
optical index. 
• Clear and positivist empiricism translates according to him into a simple 
‘conduct’ that is a ‘necessary and sufficient reference’, such as the search 
for all forces present in a given frame of reference to describe a motion, 
or, in optics, a relation to the concept based on geometric optics 
experiments (typically in terms of optical index) or on the historical 
experiments of Fizeau, Morley & Michelson, etc. 
• Classical rationalism is characterized by the rational integration of a 
concept into a ‘body of notions’; ‘It’s the time of notional solidarity’ in 
Newtonian mechanics or Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism. 
• Complete rationalism proceeds through ‘an opening into the interior of 
the notion’ which can then be analyzed; ‘It is touched by relativity: an 
organization is rational relative to a body of ideas’. It is the time of 
special relativity or the taking into account of complex propagation 
regimes of light (nonlinear optics, disordered or metamaterial media, 
etc.). 
• Discursive rationalism, the ultimate opening of the dialectical philosophy 
of why not? does not refrain from questioning the very foundations of 
concepts, and, here, takes into account arguments pertaining for instance 
to general relativity (e.g. Mach’s bucket thought experiment [42]) or 
quantum field theory). 
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In the context of the present study, two additional components should be considered, 
namely: 
• Conformist thinking, or automatic commitment to what one understands 
would comply to a given paradigm. Note that conformist thinking, of 
scholastic essence, differs from classical rationalism only in that the 
concept is integrated in the paradigm’s body of notions without 
conscious rationale, or only through irrelevant, emotion-driven pseudo-
reasoning. 
• and Immediate thinking, informed or not. 
The components originally proposed by Bachelard made it possible to identify a rather 
comprehensive structure of the ‘scientific’ posture of an individual with regard to equally 
scientific concepts. Strictly speaking, it would probably also be appropriate to dene more 
precisely, with the aid of several adapted subdivisions, the postures ‘immediate’ and 
‘conformist’. However, our purpose being limited to a first identification of the influence of 
the paradigmatic pressure, we will stick to this gross grain and limit here the field of 
application of this tool to professional scientists whose informed immediate thinking, for 
instance, can not be confused with a lack of ability to justify an answer. 
 
2. Original Bachelardian tool 
As an illustration, the philosopher established his own epistemological profiles relating to 
the concepts of mass and energy and shows that they present differences related both to his 
culture and to his personal and daily experience of the two concepts (Figs. 1 & 2). 
 
FIG. 1. Gaston Bachelard’s own personal epistemological profiles relative to the concept of 
mass, as determined by himself in [34] (fac simile) 
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The French philosopher of science considers himself mostly classically rationalist about 
both notions. For him, ‘to the extend that it is a clear notion, the notion of mass is above all a 
rational notion, which was shaped during a period of classical education and developed 
during a long period of teaching elementary physics’, while he ‘gives a greater importance to 
the dialectized concept of energy [since it] has found its realization already, which is not the 
case for the concept of mass’; however, ‘as if to compensate, there subsists in us a confused 
knowledge or energy [...] made up of a mixture of pig-headedness and of rage [...]’. 
 
 
FIG. 2. Same as Fig. 1, but for the concept of energy 
It should be noted, however, that if epistemological profiles allow, to a certain extent, a 
rough quantitative approach to the paradigmatic pressure, then it will only have the same 
value as in regard to a given subject and about a given concept. 
 
3. Expanded profiles including conformist thinking 
The primary object of The Philosophy of the No is to discuss how enlightened minds, 
endowed with a solid scientific culture and a ne understanding of the nature of science, are 
likely to react to the emergence of new concepts (non-Lavoisian chemistry, non-Euclidean 
geometry, etc.). Since Bachelard himself encouraged his readers to ‘use philosophical 
elements detached from the systems in which they originated’ [34], a first generalization can 
be to adapt the approach to less sophisticated audiences, such as teachers primary education, 
of whom it is possible to establish the epistemological profiles - most of them empiricist - but 
at the cost of a considerable sweetening of the philosophical ‘levels’ considered [35]. 
In the same spirit, insofar as we are interested here in the relation to authority and the 
possible interference of non-scientific access routes to knowledge, we will allow ourselves to 
add two components to the Bachelardian schema: evaluating the relative importance of a 
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conformist thinking in the relation of the subject to a given concept ; and of an immediate 
thinking component. While we place them for simplicity at the left of the diagram, this does 
not imply any anteriority in the subject’s personal conceptual history. The relative weights of 
the epistemological components is still relative (hence arbitrary units). 
By construction, this addition does not change the epistemological profiles of the 
philosopher, whose entire works show that he never gives in to these modalities; indeed, their 
weight is therefore essentially null for him with regards to the concepts considered (Fig. 3). 
 
FIG. 3. Gaston Bachelard’s expanded personal epistemological profiles 
relative to the concepts of mass (left, blue) and energy (right, red). Same 
as Figs.1 & 2, respectively, but with two additional (null) components to 
the left (arbitrary units) 
 
 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
 
A. Identification of ‘sensitive’ concepts and formulations 
We will consider more specifically two well-established physical concepts, fully 
consensual in the scientific community. To test the importance of the formulations and the 
cultural context, each one will be approached from two different angles, chosen according to 
the cultural autonomy that they may have acquired, or not, beyond their initial scientific 
framework. 
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The first of these concepts is the velocity of light. Object of polemics in the seventeenth 
century (does light spreads more or less quickly in a material medium than in a vacuum?), it 
stabilized rapidly in the eighteenth where, with the maturity of the Geometric Optics, it was 
reinterpreted in terms of optical index, now defined as the ratio between the velocity of light 
in a vacuum (c) and the phase velocity of a wave in a material, n = c/vf. Then, with the 
reinterpretation of c as the limit speed for the transport of energy and information within the 
framework of the special theory of relativity (1905), whose pseudo-paradoxes fascinate the 
general public, the need arises to distinguish several definitions of the speed of light (group, 
signal, front velocities, etc., fully understood since 1914 [43]). 
We will therefore try to compare, for the same subjects, epistemological profiles relating 
to the same concept of velocity of light, first considered in the presumed neutral formulation 
of Geometric Optics (i.e. in terms of optical index), then in the possibly more disturbing 
formulation of ‘velocity of light’, which ‘everyone knows’ cannot be exceeded [44] — even 
though various recent experiments have demonstrated superluminal group and signal 
velocities [45]. 
The second concept is that of relativity of motion. At the heart of the Galilean revolution, 
in its astronomical formulation, it debunks the Copernican quarrel and opposes the deep 
cultural anchoring of the idea that ‘the Earth revolves around the Sun’ (and not the other way 
around!). We still find signatures of this way of thinking in the mocking reactions faced by 
people who ignore them. Reformulated in more neutral terms, widely used in the usual 
courses and manuals of mechanics (scientific terminology, first year of college) in the context 
of Newtonian physics, it typically solves problems concerning the relative movement of trains 
or of rides and involves the choice of a reference frame for the description of a motion and/or 
the comparison of the description of a motion in different reference frames. 
Here again, we will compare epistemological profiles relative to the same concept of 
relativity of motion, considered first in the presumably neutral formulation of classical 
mechanics, then in the most disturbing, even anti-Copernican, of the question of the 
movement of the sun around the Earth. 
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B. A priori estimation of the associated paradigmatic pressure 
An attempt to qualitatively identify the frequency of references to these concepts makes it 
possible to advance a first hypothesis on the different relative paradigmatic pressure levels: 
• the concept of optical index, which is rather technical, is not associated 
with a specific paradigm (it is used as well in geometrical optics as in the 
theory of Maxwell’s electromagnetism, and even in quantum optics). It 
does not seem to be particularly mediatized and one can expect a low 
paradigmatic pressure. In terms of conformist thinking, we can associate 
limiting prejudices such as ‘The optical index is always positive and 
greater than 1’ (actually an invalid proposition in some exotic 
metamaterials [46]);  
• the concept of velocity of light is today associated with the Einsteinian 
paradigm. Beyond the scientific community, references to the Einsteinian 
paradigm remain conned to certain audiences (such as ‘geeks’ and 
science fiction fans) and specialized programs, and moderate 
paradigmatic pressure can be expected. Associated formulation: ‘One 
can never exceed the velocity of light’; 
• the principle of relativity, considered from the mechanistic point of view, 
is associated with the Galilean paradigm. This problem is essentially 
absent from the media. We can therefore expect a weak paradigmatic 
pressure. Related conformist wording: ‘All physical reference frames are 
equally legitimate’. 
• the same, considered from the astronomical point of view, remains 
largely associated with the Copernican paradigm (although Galileo’s 
name is often associated with it: ‘And yet it moves!’). Associated 
formulation: ‘The Earth revolves around the Sun (implicitly: and not the 
other way around)’. References are frequent and easily provoke 
passionate responses: this suggests a strong paradigmatic pressure. 
 
C. Description of the sample 
To test these working hypotheses, we have chosen to construct the expanded 
epistemological profiles of a sample of high-level academics and intellectuals, including two 
experienced physicists to avoid any bias related to possible problem comprehension concepts. 
The establishment of broadened epistemological profiles is based on interviews, e-mail 
exchanges and personal knowledge of the participants in the study. 
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These epistemological profiles were co-constructed by the two authors in a concerted 
manner. For each subject, the importance of each component was evaluated independently 
and then the ordinates were normalized (sum of the different components = 1, arbitrary scale 
on the ordinate axis but identical for all the profiles) to facilitate the comparison of the 
profiles. 
Our sample consists in four high-level academics (Table VII), presumably less likely than 
students to conform to other people’s opinions, since their own professional achievements 
should constitute a sufficient source of self-esteem [47]: 
Prof. A Prof. B Prof. C Dr. D 
Physicist Physicist Mathematician Sociologist 
TABLE VII. Respective Fields of the four Academics 
 
First, we interviewed two senior physicists, university professors emeritus and successive 
Heads of the same large research laboratory, in which the interviews were conducted. Since 
one of the authors (EP) is also a physicist, the interviews were based on mutual professional 
understanding and respect. Both Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism and Einstein’s special 
theory of relativity are familiar to them, as are experiments based on the principle of a limit 
speed of light. 
Professor A has been Head of the Physics Department of his university. An experimental 
physicist, his problem-solving approach often goes through an hands on representation / 
visualization. Generally recognized for his pedagogical skills, he devoted considerable effort 
to the improvement of the understanding of mechanics by his students. 
Prof. B has also taught mechanics and optics to undergraduate university students. She is 
the author of popular science books. An experimental physicist with a strong theoretical 
background, writing down equations is nevertheless often her first reflex to solve a scientific 
problem. 
The other two members of our sample were interviewed during an interdisciplinary 
workshop combining science and fiction. 
A university professor in mathematics, Prof. C is deputy head of a major Maths 
laboratory. He is passionate about science fiction and used to thinking ‘outside the box’. 
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A sociologist, Dr. D is research director at the French CNRS and deputy head of a large 
Sociology laboratory. Dr. D is very interested in the sociology of science and of education. A 
former science undergraduate, he claims to remember his physics classes. 
 
 
V. SOME EFFECTS OF THE STRONG COPERNICAN PARADIGMATIC PRESSURE 
A. Effect on two physicists 
1. Expanded epistemological profiles on the concept of velocity of light 
Figures (4) and (5) show the expanded profiles of the Profs. A and B relative to the 
concept of velocity of light formulated respectively in terms of index and propagation. A first 
observation is the similarity of these profiles, dominated by the classic clear and positivist 
empiricism and rationalist components. 
 
FIG. 4. Expanded epistemological profiles of Profs. A (left, blue) and B (right, red) relative to the concept 
of velocity of light formulated in terms of index (arbitrary units) 
Passionate about the history of science, Professor A was interested in the history of optics 
and the historical experiences he knows in depth. We found in him an empiricist component 
more marked than in Professor B, who tends to favor formal reasoning. 
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FIG. 5. Same as Fig.4, but now formulated in terms of (superluminal) propagation 
Both present a significant share of complete rationalism on the concept of propagation of 
light, possibly related to the fact that, as part of their management duties, they became aware 
of work on the superluminal propagation of light pulses carried out in their laboratory. 
While the ‘discursive rationalism’ and ‘conformist thinking’ components remain rather 
low in both profiles when approaching the concept in terms of index, the presumably 
moderate paradigmatic pressure associated to the issue of superluminal propagation 
nevertheless appears sufficient to yield a moderate, yet significant on the profile of Prof. A, 
who visibly appears uncomfortable when one speaks of phenomena of superluminal 
propagation, even if he fully understands and readily admits the mechanisms at work. Namely, 
while the general allure of his profile remains stable, a noticeable conformist component 
appears, mostly at the expense of the empiricist and classical rationalist components (Fig. 6). 
 
FIG. 6. Emergence of a conformist component under moderate paradigmatic pressure: 
Prof. A’s epistemological profiles relative to the concept of velocity of light 
formulated in terms of optical index (low PP, darker, left) or superluminal propagation 
(moderate PP, lighter, right) 
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Prof. B’s epistemological profile remains mostly stable with both formulations. 
 
2. Concept of the relativity of motion considered from a mechanical point of view 
The profiles of the same Profs. A and B are now being considered when they are asked to 
mobilize their knowledge on issues related to the relativity of movement, such as the 
description of that of a person on a carousel in different frames of reference or that of the 
relative movement of the Earth and the Sun. 
 
FIG. 7. Expanded epistemological profiles of Profs. A (left, blue) & B (right, red) 
relative to the concept of relativity of motion formulated from a mechanical point of 
view (arbitrary units) 
 
Both profiles relative to the concept of relativity of motion formulated from a mechanical 
point of view (Fig. 7) are again rather similar and present a classic rationalist dominant 
associated with a strong part of clear and positivist empiricism perfectly adapted to the 
formulation of the strictly ‘classical’ problem proposed. They correspond to the intuition a 
priori of the profile of academics based on the experience of a long career teaching 
Newtonian mechanics, with which they both are perfectly at ease; and maybe especially of 
French academics, since ‘the substitution of mechanics or mathematical physics for 
theoretical physics’ has sometimes been considered ‘a salient feature’ of the French reception 
of relativity [48]. 
They also present comparable rationalist components, both ‘complete’ and ‘discursive’. 
None of them conducted research in this area of Einsteinian relativity, but both have a broad 
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knowledge of modern physics. Prof. B, more accustomed to theoretical discourses, seems to 
have more confidence than Prof. A in her own understanding of the theories of special and 
especially general relativity, the latter taking the time of reflection, punctuated by several 
‘Wait, wait, wait!’ 
Finally, the residual part of conformist thought related to the invocation of the authority 
of Einstein or Galileo during an exchange on the relativity of the movement accounts for the 
acquisition of consciously assumed automatisms of thought, sometimes used as shortcuts. 
 
3. Concept of the relativity of movement considered from an astronomical point of view 
The epistemological profiles of the two physicists with regard to the relativity of the 
movement of the Earth and the Sun, considered from the very disturbing point of view of the 
geocentric reference (Fig. 8) appear on the other hand very different, between them as with 
regard to the profiles previously obtained from a mechanic point of view (Fig. 7). If the 
empiricist and rationalist classical components remain dominant in the Prof. A and important 
in the Prof. B, the complete and discursive rationalisms practically disappear, whereas a very 
important conformist thinking component appears in both. 
 
FIG. 8. Same as Fig.7, but now from an astronomical point of view 
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4. Some modalities of resurgence of conformist thinking 
After attending a class for primary school teachers ending with a discussion of the equal 
legitimacy of an observer’s point of view on the Earth and that of an observer on the Sun [15, 
49], Prof. A strongly disagreed on the ‘equivalence’ between terrestrial and solar points of 
view. An epistolary exchange was then started by sending him excerpts from Mach’s Science 
of Mechanics (1883 [42]). A constant during these exchanges was the search by Professor A 
of experiences or facts that might justify the non-equivalence of the two reference systems: ‘Is 
there not a way to show that the two points of view are not equivalent?’ Even though he easily 
admits in oral discussions that the very impossibility of such means is indeed one of the basic 
principles of the general theory of relativity (1916), he nevertheless argues that some models 
would be ‘truer’ than others, because of a supposedly better ‘explanatory power’, even if he 
recognizes their formal equivalence and offers no theoretical argument in favor of such a 
distinction. Einsteinian when it comes to the principles or problems explicit involving clocks, 
Prof. A becomes fiercely Newtonian again when it comes to reasoning concretely on a 
geocentric model. This modality seems largely unconscious in his case. 
Prof. B expressed even more strongly her disagreement at the same course, stating 
authoritatively that ‘there are plenty of experiences that show that the Earth is spinning 
[around the Sun]’. When asked to quote at least one, she changes her argument and shifts into 
a highly passionate mode: ‘You can not say things like that to teachers, because otherwise 
everything is relative and you open the way to all the excesses. We can’t jeopardize all the 
work we’ve done to make it clear that the Earth is turning.’ She fully assumes to encourage 
teachers to wrongfully condemn an actually legitimate interpretation, ‘Let [the students] say 
that it is false rather than letting them believe that the Sun turns around Earth, because they 
would not understand,’ and considers that in this situation ‘it is not necessarily welcome to 
shake the teachers’ views.’ 
She thus expresses, in a fully conscious and deliberate way, though very passionate, a 
posture of thought resolutely conform to an obsolete, though dominant, Copernican paradigm 
and in contradiction not only with her own scientific knowledge, but also with the primacy of 
experience, the latter being in his opinion secondary in this specific case. The high importance 
that she attributes as a physics teacher to the heliocentric approach, and therefore the strong 
conformist component of her response, seems to be much less a question of her own 
adherence to this model (she claims to be fully Einsteinian as a researcher) than of the 
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mission that she considers as essential and a priority, as a representative of the scholarly 
community, to block ideas that she considers dangerous for unprepared minds, such as 
primary school teachers, let alone their students. One may be tempted to recognize there, at 
this time, a sociological posture of ‘gate-keeper’ [41] regulating and limiting the expression of 
these ideas outside the authorized circle of the recognized physics community, possibly 
reinforced in the case of relativity by the idea that ‘the public is irretrievably doomed to 
incomprehension’ being, according to French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, ‘so profoundly 
embedded in the social definition of the intellectual’s vocation that it tends to be taken for 
granted’ [48, 50]. 
 
5. Synthesis 
For physicist Prof. A, a moderate paradigmatic pressure results in a noticeable increase in 
conformist thinking (Fig. 6, velocity of light). A passage to a strong paradigmatic pressure 
(geocentrism, (Fig. 8, left) further increases this component, which nevertheless remains 
rather minor, since a kind of mechanism of epistemological self-defense seems to set up with 
a relative increase in the empiricist component at the expense of rationalisms complete and 
discursive (Fig. 9). 
 
FIG. 9. Significant change in Prof. A’s epistemological profile relative to the 
concept of relativity of motion between the low (mechanical) and strong 
(astronomical) pressure point of views 
A moderate paradigmatic pressure does not induce a significant increase in conformist 
thinking in Prof. B, also a physicist, while the discursive rationalist component increases a 
little (Fig. 5, right). On the other hand, a disturbing approach to the Copernican problematic 
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makes her switch, no doubt deliberately, towards a largely unscientific gate-keeper posture, 
including a strong conformist component (Fig. 10). 
 
FIG. 10. Same as Fig. 9, but for Prof. B 
 
In both cases, each physicist’s epistemological profiles relative to the concepts of 
velocity of light (Figs. 4 & 5) as well as to the concept of relativity of motion (mechanical 
point of view, Fig. 7) remain fairly similar (despite a stronger ‘classical rationalism’ 
component in the latter) as long as only no formulation likely to induce a strong paradigmatic 
pressure is involved. On the other hand, we observe a dramatic change of both profiles 
relative to the concept of relativity of motion as soon as the formulation involves the 
Copernican issue (Figs. 9 & 10, right). It should be noted that the empiricist and classical 
rationalist components always remain significant, even when some conformist thinking sets 
up. 
 
 
B. A purely mathematical response 
While informal discussions on other physical concepts suggest for the other, non-
physicist academics of the sample profiles also dominated by the empiricist and rationalist 
components, more detailed exchanges on the heliocentrism problem reveal more singular 
profiles to this respect. 
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Figure 11 presents the expanded epistemological profiles of Prof. C, a professional 
mathematician, relative to the concept of relativity of motion considered from an astronomical 
point of view. 
 
FIG. 11. Expanded epistemological profile of Prof. C relative to the concept of 
relativity of motion formulated form an astronomical point of view (arbitrary units). 
Note the strong ‘Immediate thinking’ component 
Prof. C claims a good mastery of Newtonian celestial mechanics but, rather than 
historical advances in physics (Galilean or Einsteinian), the equal legitimacy of the two 
reference frames appears to be a mathematical banality for him, based on arguments of patent 
symmetry. This a-physical posture is an unexpected form of thought that is both immediate 
and scholarly, with no identifiable conformist component, even in the form of a social 
norm [6]. 
It is interesting to note that Prof. C is also a regular reader of ‘hard science ction’, 
including novels speculating about alternate theories of Relativity, such as Greg Egan’s 
Orthogonal trilogy [51], and likes to speculate about the corresponding formalisms, which 
may account for the significant ‘discursive rationalism’ of his profile relative to this notion. 
Generally, he seems fairly insensitive to the paradigmatic pressure associated with 
physical questions. 
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C. Effect on a Sociologist 
1. Short-term response 
Also claiming a certain (although possibly more questionable) mastery of Newtonian 
mechanics, Dr. D is at first surprised by the relativistic argument, that he says to be 
discovering. He nevertheless seems to understand and accept it, though perhaps partly on the 
basis of the authority he recognizes in the matter to his interlocutors. 
His epistemological profile presents a strong conformist component, together with a 
significant rationalist one but no, or only very weak, empiricist component (Figure 12). 
 
FIG. 12. Short-term expanded epistemological profile of Dr. D 
relative to the concept of relativity of motion formulated from an 
astronomical point of view (arbitrary units) 
 
2. Delayed response 
A few days after the interview, after he had conversations with other non-specialist 
teachers, he clearly receded this acquiescence, by mail, on the basis of arguments which he 
himself recognizes as ‘ideological’. He explained that ‘geocentrism is associated with clerical 
obscurantism and the heliocentric system marks the victory of scientific audacity against 
religious dogma. Of course, these ‘political’ biases are part of the epistemological obstacle’ 
[also a Bachelardian concept [8], discussed with Dr. D during his interview]. He clearly 
identifies a problematic relationship with authority and insists that the Einstein quote: ‘The 
two propositions, ‘the Sun is motionless and the Earth rotates’ or ‘the Sun turns and the 
Earth is motionless’, merely signify two different conventions concerning two different 
coordinate systems.’ [52], although it ‘seems logical to [him]’, actually induced in him a 
Blanquet & Picholle — Paradigmatic Pressure — PRPER 29 
semi-conscious attitude of the kind: ‘Keep talking, but I’m not listening’...’ [‘Cause toujours, 
je n’écoute pas’ — his phrasing] 
 
3. Long-term response 
On his next meeting with one of the authors (EB), more than a year after these exchanges, 
Dr. D came to her on his own initiative to tell her that, after some time had passed, he had 
decided to read about the theories of relativity, including some original works of Galileo [13] 
and Einstein [52] themselves but also from other authors, had attended popularization 
conferences, etc. He could not remember a particular episode that had him change his mind 
again, but the principle of relativity did now appear to him ‘just obvious’. Another meeting, a 
few months later, confirmed that his position seemed serenely stabilized. 
It was not possible to set up a new interview with the two authors, but it seems reasonable 
to infer that Dr. D had fully transitioned from a at least partial adherence to the Copernican 
heliocentric paradigm to a full participation to the Galilean, or even Galileo-Einsteinian, 
relativist paradigm. 
Also an avid reader of hard science fiction, Dr. D did not seem to seriously question the 
concept of relativity in his new understanding (discursive rationalism), nor did attempt to 
relativize them with regard to even more sophisticated approaches, such as General relativity 
(complete rationalism), and still he makes no direct reference to experimental evidences 
(empiricism). 
If, regardless of the difference in procedure, we try to translate these observations onto a 
new epistemological profile of Dr. D and compare it to the earlier one (Fig. 13), it appears 
that the profile remained mostly unchanged: while its ‘conformist thinking’ component has 
dramatically shifted from compliance to the Copernican paradigm towards compliance to the 
Galilean paradigm, it still remains a key feature of his profile. 
Our sociologist appears extremely sensitive to Copernican paradigmatic pressure and 
shifts in full awareness towards a largely conformist thought. It is interesting to note that it is 
still in full awareness to comply to the dominant paradigm that he shifts again towards the 
relativist paradigm, after making sure from several different sources that it is indeed the 
current consensus among physicists. 
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FIG. 13. Expanded epistemological profiles of Dr. D relative to the concept of relativity 
of motion formulated form an astronomical point of view before (left, darker) and after 
(right, lighter) his final shift towards the relativist paradigm. While conformist thinking 
does is no longer complies to the same paradigm, the aspect of the epistemological 
profile remains mostly unchanged 
 
 
D. Comparison and discussion 
1. Specialty-dependence of epistemological profiles 
Despite the very limited size of our sample, an obvious feature of the considered 
epistemological profiles is the general similarity of all physicist’s profiles (Profs A & B, Figs. 
4-10), at least as far as the conformist component is not considered, while they have very little 
in common either with a mathematician’s (Prof. C, Fig. 11) or a sociologist’s (Dr. D, Figs. 12 
& 13) profiles. It must nevertheless be kept in mind that all the considered profiles were 
relative to physical notions, and that these differences likely derive from comparing 
specialists and non-specialists profiles. 
The strong and robust conformist component of Dr. D’s profiles relative to physical 
notions thus doesn’t suggest in any way that conformist thinking is a normal component of 
sociology. Much to the contrary, one can speculate that this component might well totally 
disappear in his profiles relative to the sociological notions he is a specialist of, while a 
symmetric conformist component might appear in the physicists’ profiles relative to these 
sociological notions. Unfortunately, the varication of this intuition is well beyond the scope of 
Blanquet & Picholle — Paradigmatic Pressure — PRPER 31 
this study, as the authors definitely lack the sociological hindsight that would be necessary to 
establish such profiles. 
Similarly, it would be interesting to determine whether the apparent insensitivity of 
Prof. C to the pressure associated to physical paradigms remains in his own field, and to study 
his response to the strong pressure associated with a disturbing approach to a mathematical 
paradigm. 
 
2. A nonlinear response? 
Dr. D’s brutal changes in epistemological profiles, both short- and long-term, followed 
by periods of stability, is somewhat reminiscent of the behavior of some bistable systems, 
already observed in opinion dynamics [53]. Since Prof. B rapid shift from strictly scientific to 
‘gate-keeper’ postures might also be reminiscent of bifurcation-type behaviors, these 
observations suggest that individual responses to paradigmatic pressure might be highly non-
linear processes depending on the pressure level, and therefore probably largely unpredictable 
for a given individual, even if it was possible to quantify precisely this level. On the other 
hand, such nonlinear models could have a statistical sense about large populations, in the 
spirit of sociophysics [54]. 
 
3. Features of scientific conformity 
Our observations strongly suggest several striking features of conformist thinking relative 
to scientific issues: 
• Scar components of conformist thinking remain latent even in highly 
informed and professional scientific minds. 
Indeed, although any generalization from our limited data would be abusive, they are in 
full accordance with Gaston Bachelard’s own assumptions and conclusions about the 
formation of the scientific mind [8], and his very motivation for developing epistemological 
profiles as a tool to take such components into account [34], even if he didn’t explicitly 
consider the case of conformist thinking. 
• Strong paradigmatic pressure appears to be an efficient trigger for 
conformist thinking. 
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• The emergence of conformist thinking can either happen together with 
the simultaneous emergence of the complete & discursive rationalist 
components or, to the contrary, at their expense 
• Under strong paradigmatic pressure, the emergence of conformist 
thinking may follow very different rationale. 
The last two items might be strongly correlated, as exemplified by the very different 
responses of Profs. A & B (Figs. 9 & 10). Finally: 
• An epistemological profile involving a strong conformist component 
may remain mostly unchanged even when the bearer’s understanding of 
the considered notion undergoes a complete reversal. 
In other words, a conformist thinking process relative to a given notion may appear 
mostly independent from the actual paradigm the bearer is conforming to (namely, Copenican 
or Galilean as exemplified by the case of Dr. D, Fig. 13). 
 
 
VI. ALTERNATIVE TEACHING STRATEGIES TO AVOID CONFORMIST THINKING 
 
A. Daring historical approaches 
In terms of science education, a key issue deriving from the above findings is that a same 
given scientific concept (e.g. the principle of the relativity of motion) can appear either fairly 
easy or extremely difficult to teach efficiently, and for the students to accept, depending on 
the level of paradigmatic pressure associated, not necessarily to the concept itself, but to some 
formulations or examples likely to trigger it. 
A direct corollary seems to be that, as far as the transmission of scientific concepts only 
is concerned (as opposed to the teaching of the history of science), teachers might find it 
advantageous to avoid ‘hot’ issues and formulations, more likely associated with stronger 
paradigmatic pressures, and on the contrary to favor harmless examples. For instance, 
teaching the physics of Galilean relativity though considerations over merry-go-rounds rather 
than the relative motion of the Earth and the Sun... 
Yet, as far as the associated paradigmatic pressure can be an indication of the importance 
of a given issue in our common scientific culture, some teachers may also consider it part of 
their duty to have their students confront some hot issues. 
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If we admit that the efficiency of direct, head-on strategies is likely to be very low, as 
suggested by the disturbingly high proportion of conformist Copernican thinking observed 
even among rather advanced students, are other strategies available ? 
While some scientists can appear rather pessimistic, like Max Planck who is quoted by 
Thomas Kuhn [38] saying that ‘a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its 
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and 
a new generation grows up that is familiar with it’, others, including the very pioneers of 
modern science, attempted to develop new transmission strategies when confronted with the 
(then presumably even stronger than today!) paradigmatic pressure (then Ptolemean rather 
than Copernican, obviously) associated with the heliocentric concept. 
While Giordano Bruno’s and Galileo’s efforts brought such literary and historical gems 
as The Ash Wednesday Supper [55] or The Starry Messenger [56], the most interesting 
enterprise might be Johannes Kepler’s. As a student, and as early as 1593, Kepler devoted one 
of his required dissertations to the question: ‘How would the phenomena occurring in the 
heavens appear to an observer stationed on the Moon?’ [57]. Later, as a full-edged 
astronomer, his key work in defence of the Copernican system, the Astronomia Nova [58], 
established that, whatever the point of view, observation alone does not allow to determine 
whether a celestial body is fixed or not — hence to decide between the Copernican and the 
Ptolemean systems. However, regardless of its importance fo the history of science, the 
Astronomia Nova is a highly mathematized work, inabordable to the common reader, and 
possibly even to most early-XVIIth Century astronomers. 
Kepler then went back to the narrative approach, and to the idea of a Lunar observer, with 
the Somnium [59] —which some argue might also be considered the very first science fiction 
novel [60]. Despite being a major literary, and personal, failure [57] (written ca. 1609, it only 
appeared as a posthumous work in 1634), the Somnium was a brilliant and explicit attempt to 
reach and convert a wider audience. Getting the reader to suspend his incredulity and accept, 
for the duration of a story, to partake to a Lunar point of view allowed him avoid the (then) 
considerable pressure of the Ptolemean paradigm, focused on the Terran and Solar points of 
view. Then, the reader’s acceptance of the legitimacy a particular non-Terran (namely, Lunar) 
point of view would hopefully allow him to also accept the legitimacy of other non-Terran 
points of view, such as a Solar one — and thus easily shift to heliocentrism. 
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Similarly, it has been argued that accepting the concept of earthshine, introduced by 
Galileo in his watercolors of the Moon [56, 61] would also have been seen ‘as supporting a 
Copernican world system’ [62]. 
Taking advantage of modern fast computing techniques to instantly shift the point of 
view of spectators immersed in a planetarium from geocentric to allocentric, for instance 
selenocentric, has also been proposed to help participants understand the phases of the 
Moon [63]. 
Other original approaches include theatrical reenacting of Galileo’s Dialogue [13, 64]. 
 
B. Two IBSE sequences 
 
In Kepler’s spirit, an investigation-based science education sequence, ‘Will Earth come 
out of the frame?’ [49] was designed around a painting by science fiction artist Manchu, 
‘Framed Earth’ (Fig.14) [65] to have the participant work on the idea of an equal legitimacy 
of all reference frames. 
 
FIG. 14. ‘Framed Earth’ by Science Fiction artist Manchu 
Another sequence had them work on the spatial geometry of orbiting frames by having 
them represent the Earth and the Earth with their bodies, with one student ‘orbiting’ around 
the other, or manipulating Styrofoam spheres (Fig.15). The latter sequence is rather classical, 
and adapted to primary school pupils and their teachers, and generally to participants of any 
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age not fully at ease with the relevant mathematical tools or not having good enough 
spontaneous spatial visualization [66] (like presumably most future teachers). 
 
FIG. 15. Future primary school teachers drawings of themselves holding spheres 
representing the relative motion of the Earth (Terre, in French) and the Sun (Soleil) 
(seq. ‘Spatial Geometry’) 
 
 
C. Necessity of a dual strategy 
 
A group of 93 post-graduate students in a primary school teaching track was thus 
subjected to the questionary described in Section II, in its modified Formulation 4 version: 
‘Two pupils are talking. One asserts that the Earth revolves around the Sun, the other that the 
Sun revolves around the Earth. They turn to you for your opinion. What do you answer 
them?’ They worked first on the ‘Framed Earth’ sequence, then took the questionnaire. With 
almost 90% of the answers of students not having previously followed the full course 
qualifying as Copernican, this approach appears almost entirely inefficient by itself (while, by 
contrast, 100% of the redoubling students qualified as Galilean). 
They then participated to the ‘spatial geometry’ sequence, and took the questionnaire 
again. This time, 60% qualified as Galilean (Table VIII) . The combination of the two 
sequences combining a training of the ability to change points of view with a work on the 
equal legitimacy of all points of views thus appear far more efficient. 
 Number Copernican Galilean 
After sequence ‘Framed 
Earth’ only 85 82  (96.5 %) 3 (3.5%) 
After both sequences 15 18 (40%) 27 (60%) 
TABLE VIII. Proportion of students validating (‘Galilean’ answer) or not 
(‘Copernican’ answer) Formulation 4 depending on the sequence(s) they participated to. 
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Subsequent discussion showed that many of these students had initially failed to even 
identify the problem, however ancient and conceptually simple it may appear to some others 
and in spite of having repeatedly studied it both in primary and secondary school. By itself, 
the usual basic strategy of directly training the participants to shift points of view (or 
reference frames, for the more mathematically inclined, as Kepler attempted in his 
Astronomia Nova [58]) thus appears fairly inefficient. 
 
 
VII. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
In the first part of this article, we have established that, while very real in certain contexts, 
some common faulty answers to basic astronomy questions, often interpreted as a sign of poor 
scientific literacy, can often be triggered by the formulation of the question. Indeed, a 
formulation focused on some aspects of a given paradigm, either current or obsolete, may 
induce a strong paradigmatic pressure and dramatically modify a person’s epistemological 
profile relative to the underlying physical notions. 
Yielding to such a pressure appears to be a very common cognitive process among the 
general public, to the point that, whether or not they’re familiar with the concepts of Galilean 
relativity, an overwhelming proportion of students, as well as of teachers and future teachers, 
fall back into an obsolete, pre-Galilean thinking, namely conformation to Copernican 
heliocentrism. 
Indeed, the paradigmatic pressure associated with the Copernican paradigm remains very 
high for certain formulations, and may profoundly alter people’s epistemological profiles. 
For the same physical concept, the paradigmatic pressure can be very different depending 
on the triggering situation. Thus, the pressure associated with the concept of relativity, which 
appears to be very strong for triggering situations in resonance with the very old Copernican 
quarrel, is on the contrary quite moderate for more neutral issues (e.g. relative motions of 
trains or merry-go-rounds). 
The effects of paradigmatic pressure on epistemological profiles are quite diverse. The 
most obvious is the appearance or increase of conformist thinking with the increase of the 
paradigmatic pressure. 
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A direct corollary in science education is the necessity for teachers to be aware of the 
paradigmatic pressure associated to certain issues or formulation. Then, they can either 
deliberately avoid them and systematically prefer lower-pressure formulations, less prone to 
trigger conformist thinking instead of more scientific empiricist or rationalist postures (or 
combinations thereof) among the students; or, when they find that they can not avoid 
confronting a triggering issue, use carefully designed sequences, or sequence combinations, to 
release some of the pressure before bringing up the problematic issues or formulations. They 
can for instance, in the spirit of Kepler’s Somnium, make a detour to deal with the legitimacy 
of a Lunar point of view before considering that of a (strongly triggering in astronomy) 
geocentric point of view in a relativistic approach. 
We have also shown that even very sophisticated and informed minds, such as those of 
veteran physicists, fully proficient in the theories of relativity, are not immune to such a 
pressure, and can also fall back into conformist thinking to pre-relativist paradigms. 
We wish to emphasize that, despite the authors’ avowed preference for making the more 
modern ideas of relativity available to teachers and students whenever possible, this study 
does not, in itself, invalidate the more cautious, gate-keeper-like arguments expresse for 
instance by Prof. B [cf. §V.A.4.], the importance of which we also fully acknowledge. A more 
thorough study on the long term effects of the teaching of Galilean relativity in primary 
school will be necessary to decide this debate. 
Finally, the epistemological profiles developed by Gaston Bachelard has proven to be 
well adapted to the evaluation of the paradigmatic pressure associated with a particular 
approach of a given concept, for a cultivated public and able to master the technical subtleties. 
Further studies will also be necessary to determine if a (at least statistically) predictive 
nonlinear model can be developed to describe the response of a given profile to a strong 
paradigmatic pressure. 
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